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SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES: ABORTION AND FEMALE BEHAVIOR
WINSTON P. NAGAN*
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 1968, the Washington Post carried a story
under the heading, "Man Pleads Guilty in Abortion Death." A 25-year-
old hospital orderly performed an abortion upon a married woman. The
woman, the mother of two children, died shortly afterward. In addi-
tion to responsibility for the woman's death, the defendant faced a pos-
sible prison term of ten years for having performed the abortion. Two
other persons were arrested in the case. An area police captain pleaded
guilty to the misdemeanor of "encouraging an abortion" and was fined
$100, while another person was to be tried later on a charge of criminal
abortion.'
This report raises a number of issues which form the core of the
abortion debate. The first and most obvious question is why did the
woman seek to procure an abortion for herself. The answer, perhaps,
is that her pregnancy was an unwanted one. Such a simplistic answer,
however, merely poses further questions. Does any woman have a right
not to have an unwanted child? Does the social order have the right to
compel her to have an unwanted child? If society does have this right
over the individual woman, should it be enforced by criminal process?
Does the unborn fetus have any rights?
At present, many states have statutes that proscribe abortions, and
such laws are enforceable through the normal criminal law processes.
Notwithstanding, society has carved out certain excusing conditions
which weaken the proscription of abortion. Moreover, social statistics
bristle with instances of "illegal" abortions which society, apparently,
conveniently overlooks. It is not inappropriate at this point to ask what
the laws which make abortions illegal and prescribe severe penalties
for performing them are meant to achieve. The answer seems to be
that such laws seek to curb the incidence of abortions.2 In practical
* Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. The author is
indebted to Jack A. Hiller, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, for
his many helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1968, § -, at -, col. -. For an excellent study
that focuses upon extra-legal abortions and investigates what the author terms the "so-
cial structure" of abortion, see N. LEE, THE SEARCH FOR AN ABORTIONIST (1969). Data
in the book were compiled from interviews with women who had had abortions and who
were relating their own experiences in seeking a person to perform the abortion.
2. [Professor Cyril C. Means] points out that in the nineteenth century, when
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terms this means that a woman may not abort her pregnancy, and that
no medical facilities may be used to assist a woman who feels compelled
to secure a termination of her pregnancy.8 The result, as in the in-
stance above, is often tragic.' While the law has prescribed a certain
pattern of behavior to be followed in the event of conception, adherence
to this standard in many instances seems to be done on a level of private
decision-making notwithstanding the supposed fear of criminal conse-
quences for noncompliance. If a woman wants badly enough to abort
her pregnancy and can afford the cost, she will abort the fetus by the
most expeditious means regardless of the legal sanctions which might be
imposed.'
The abortion problem raises some sensitive questions in the sphere
of public and private morality. In the context of social and legal pro-
cesses, the issue is raised concerning the efficacy of the law in the en-
forcement of the moral standards which are implicit in the abortion
statutes. Indeed, this general issue in the abortion context brings into
sharp focus the very fundamental question posed so felicitously by
these laws were passed, abortion-even in hospitals-was much more dangerous
than childbirth, and that the original purpose of the statutes was to compel
women to adopt the safer of the two alternatives. Since hospital abortions early
in pregnancy are much safer today than childbirth under the same hospital condi-
tions, the continued enforcement in the twentieth century of these nineteenth-
century laws now frustrates their original protective purpose by forcing women
to accept the less safe of the alternatives.
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, WHO SHALL LIVE? 26-27 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as WHO SHALL LIVE?]. See Table I, APPENDIX infra.
3. Clinically obtained abortion poses less threat to a woman's life than childbirth
complications or, indeed, general complications resulting from pregnancy. Statistics in-
dicate that the death rate from childbirth and complications of pregnancy is about 10
times higher than from clinically obtained abortions. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 55 (1971). These
statistics, if accurate, provide some support to those who argue that a woman's right to
preserve her own life justifies abortions.
4. Even those induced abortions which do not result in death for the mother are not
without their hazard. Consider the following statement of a woman who procured
an abortion:
I went to two midwives, one of whom stretched me on her kitchen floor. I
went to several physicians who refused me. I finally went to a man who said
he was a retired gynecologist who gave me a general anesthetic, with ether,
in his apartment
I concluded the episode with nine days in a London hospital, a perforated
uterus, peritonitis, and eight shots of penicillin, every day, for nine days.
D. SCHULDER & F. KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP 75 (1971) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
cited as ABORTION RAP].
5. N. LEE, THE SEARCH FOR AN ABORTIONIST (1969). Lee also asserts that it is
widely conceded "that abortion is one of the most common forms of illegal activity prac-
ticed in the United States . . . ." Id. at 3 & n.l. It is, indeed, enigmatic that the
abortion problem was so little acknowledged for so long.
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H.L.A. Hart" and Patrick Devlin.' Is it the business of the criminal
law to be concerned with enforcement of morals, whatever they might
be? Two preliminary facts appear to have been clouded over in the dust
raised by those engaged in the abortion debate. First, no one likes abor-
tions, least of all those who find themselves candidates for the process.
Secondly, the incidence of abortions in society is an historic and social
fact,8 like poverty and illness, both of which might be regarded as un-
pleasant, but which sooner or later the community must come to terms
with.
It is interesting to note that the continuing debate over the abortion
issue has produced, perhaps, two primary viewpoints. These may
be termed the fetus oriented view' and the female perspective.'"
Other views have been presented, but these seem to be the two which
best indicate the polarity between those who oppose abortion and those
who advocate it.
This article will present some aspects of both views, compare and
criticize them and attempt to synthesize the views into a more realistic
concept.
THE RIGHT-TO-LIFE ARGUMENT: THE FETUS-AS-PERSON
If one assumes that the fetus is a person and that it is a morally
and legally accepted datum that every person has a right to life, it follows
as a general proposition that the fetus has a right to life and cannot be
aborted by the mother. While this line of reasoning suggests that the
mother is a separate and distinct entity from the fetus, biological and
psychological facts may indicate the contrary. Nevertheless, if, for the
sake of argument, it is accepted that the fetus is a person distinct from
the woman, then a basic antinomy is introduced into the problem, be-
6. H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1966).
7. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
8. Women have always practiced abortion or attempted it, in spite of taboos,
laws, even the death penalty. The considerations that drove them to it in ancient
times were probably very much the same as those motivating women today:
poverty, illness, advanced age or extreme youth, the burden of too many chil-
dren, the disgrace of bearing an illegitimate child, fear of discovery of infidelity,
and numerous other social and psychological causes.
WHO SHALL LIVE? 18. See also M. SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1938) ; Jackson, Book
Review, 82 L.Q. REv. 566 (1966). Early records, however, reveal that cultural attitudes
on abortion ranged from tolerance to approval to absolute prohibtion. WHO SHALL
LIT? 19.
9. E.g., D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY (1970); G. GRISEZ,
ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS (1970) ; THE MORALITY
OF ABORTION-LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
10. E.g., N. LEE, THE SEARCH FOR AN ABORTIONIST (1969); D. SCHULDER & F.
KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP (1971).
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cause it is also accepted that everyone has the right to some integrity
over his person. Thus, it seems a natural derivative that the mother
has a right to determine what will happen in and to her body.
It would be further argued that the right to life is more significant
than the right to privacy. Under this analysis, a fetus may not be aborted,
for this would be tantamount to killing a person.1 While this way of
stating the moral justification for the legal proscription of abortions
is compelling, in this writer's view the argument is overly simplistic;
indeed, this view masks even more difficult problems of moral and
social import and seems to assume that the right to life is unproblem-
atic. 12
[The] right to life includes having a right to be given at least
the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose
that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs for con-
tinued life is something he has no right at all to be given ?"a
For example, if one has a kidney ailment that will surely kill him if the
kidney is not removed, and someone else has a kidney that could ad-
equately replace the diseased organ, the first person surely does not
have a "right" to the other's healthy kidney. Moreover, even those who
believe that the fetus is a "person" have generally conceded exceptions
for pregnancies caused by rape or incest. Indeed, many legal systems
have allowed the termination of pregnancy in such instances. It seems,
then, that only certain classes of fetus-as-persons have the right to life.
Thus, the "person" conceived in rape or incest has less right to life
than the "person" conceived in other circumstances. This point becomes
all the more compelling when one peruses the dissenting opinion of
Judge Campbell in the case of Doe v. Scott," where the Illinois abor-
tion statute was overturned. 5 While Judge Campbell declared that he
"avoided any discussion of the sensitive subject of whether fetal life is
11. The baby in the maternal breast has the right to life immediately from
God.-Hence there is no man, no human authority, no science, no medical,
eugenic, social, economic or moral "indication" which can establish or grant a
valid juridical ground for a direct deliberate disposition of an innocent human
life, that is a disposition which looks to its destruction either as an end or as a
means to another end perhaps in itself not illicit.-The baby, still not born, is a
man in the same degree and for the same reason as the mother.
Address by Pope Pius XII to Italian Catholic Society of Midwives, quoted in Thompson,
A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PuB. AFFAIRS 45, 51 n.6 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Thompson].
12. See Thompson 54-55.
13. Id. at 55.
14. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1969).
1972]
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'human' life,"'" he added that he believed there is a valid state interest
in "the protection of human life or at least the protection of potential
human life in the fetus."'" This familiar argument has been character-
ized as the acorn-is-an-oak-tree thesis or the slippery slope position.
Yet it is not a position that can or should be treated in too cavalier a
fashion. Consider the following observations quoted in Judge Camp-
bell's dissent:
"Eleven years ago while giving an anesthetic for a ruptured
ectopic pregnancy (at two months gestation) I was handed
what I believe was the smallest living human being ever seen.
The embryo sac was intact and transparent. Within the sac
was a tiny (approx. 1 cm.) human male swimming extremely
vigorously in amniotic fluid, while attached to the wall by the
umbilical cord. This tiny human was perfectly developed, with
long, tapering fingers, feet and toes. It was almost trans-
parent, as regards the skin, and the delicate arteries and veins
were prominent to the ends of the fingers.
"The baby was extremely alive and swam about the sac
approximately one time per second, with a natural swimmer's
stroke. This tiny human did not look at all like the photos and
drawings and models of 'embryos' which I have seen, nor did
it look like a few embryos I have been able to observe since
then, obviously because this one was alive!
" When the sac was opened, the tiny human im-
mediately lost its life and took on the appearance of what is ac-
cepted as the appearance of an embryo at this age (blunt ex-
tremities, etc.).
"It is my opinion that if the lawmakers and people realized
that very vigorous life is present, it is possible that abortion
would be found much more objectionable than euthanasia.""
This kind of medical evidence creates a presumption about the
nature of fetal life and, in particular, suggests that the characterization
of the fetus as a person may require us to value the fetus at a premium
16. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1395 (dissenting opinion).
17. Id. at 1396.
18. Id. at 1394, citing Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 5, 32 (1970). The event was experienced by Paul E. Rockwell, M.D., Di-
rector of Anesthesiology, Leonard Hospital, Troy, New York. One may also note that
life is continuous, only its forms change. Sperm, ovum and fertilized egg are life forms
in a process of development; each has the potential, under the right conditions, of be-
coming a viable child. For an account of the process from fertilization to the time a
fetus may be considered viable, see WHo SHALL LIVE? 20-21.
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in our scheme of moral and legal values if the right to life is to have
meaning. Indeed, it is submitted that this characterization underscores
the fundamental way in which the abortion problem confronts our
value system. The importance of the value attached to the fetus-as-
person is accorded almost absolute sanctity by Pope Pius XI's ency-
clical letter which implies that the life of the fetus is to be valued even
more than that of its mother whose primary function is "the per-
formance of the duty allotted to her by nature," even where her life is
"gravely imperiled" by the pregnancy. Indeed, his Holiness describes
the termination of pregnancy in such a circumstance as "direct murder
of the innocent."'" Here again, the premise that the fetus is a person
creates an anomalous situation. Under this view, the fetus clearly has
a right to life. However, it should not be overlooked that the mother
also has a right to life. There may be at least three ways of resolving
this problem. First, under the right-to-privacy thesis, a decision to
terminate pregnancy would be the prerogative of the mother. The
mother may have the right to make whatever decision she chooses, be-
cause she is herself a moral agent and must accept the strictures of her
own conscience in her zone of privacy. Secondly, the social system
might prescribe the mode of conduct and allocate moral and legal re-
sponsibility accordingly under a system of penal statutes. Under this
view, Judge Campbell might hold that the state has a legitimate interest
in the fetus, and that the mother's choice must be circumscribed ac-
cordingly."0 Thirdly, organized religion could decide what is to be
done.2 If the problem of separation of church and state were to be
deemed significant, the proscription of abortions could be relegated to
the sphere of positive morality, with any sanctions to be social and re-
ligious rather than distinctly legal.
This much is certain-a woman who aborts her pregnancy to save
her life is no less guilty of "murder" than the ordinary citizen who
kills another in self-defense. But, as professor Judith Thompson has sug-
gested:
19. Thompson 51 n.4 . The position of the Catholic Church was further explained
by Pope Pius XI:
[H]owever much we may pity the mother whose health and even life is gravely
imperiled in the performance of the duty allotted to her by nature, nevertheless
what could ever be a sufficient reason for excusing in any way the direct murder
of the innocent? This is precisely what we are dealing with here.
Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius XI on Christian Marriage, quoted in Thompson 51 n.4.
20. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1394-95 (dissenting opinion).
21. Cf. Morton, Book Review, 82 L.Q. REv. 115, 117 (1966): "Religion has a well-
documented claim to leadership in this field . . . ." Id.
19721
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[I]t cannot seriously be thought to be murder if the mother
performs an abortion on herself to save her life. It cannot
seriously be said that she must refrain, that she must sit pas-
sively by and wait for her death.2
The problem of the right to life in this context is further complicated in
cases where the life of the woman is threatened, since one cannot ascribe
blameworthiness to either fetus or woman. In this situation of mutual
innocence, Professor Thompson has concluded, and this writer agrees
in substance, that the right to life of the unborn fetus must give way
to the woman's right to defend her own life against the threat posed by
the fetus.
The general problem of the right-to-life has been squarely con-
fronted in other contexts by the courts. In United States v. Holmes,2"
for example, a ship struck an iceberg and began to sink. A number of
persons managed to place themselves on board a long boat. The long
boat in which Holmes, a seaman of extraordinary heroism, found him-
self was over-crowded. When the weather deteriorated, it was clear that
unless the mate decided to cast some of the male passengers overboard,
the whole company might drown. The decision was made, and Holmes
assisted in throwing some of the men overboard. He was brought to
trial, and the jury found him guilty of manslaughter. The court, which
seemed sympathetic to the defendant in charging the jury, reasoned in
part as follows:
In such cases the law neither excuses the act nor permits
it to be justified as innocent; but, although inflicting some
punishment, she yet looks with a benignant eye, through the
thing done, to the mind and to the heart; and when, on a view
of all the circumstances connected with the act, no evil spirit is
discovered, her humanity forbids the exaction of life for life.
But though . . . cases of this kind are viewed with tender-
ness, and punished in mercy, we must yet bear in mind that
man, in taking away the life of a fellow being, assumes an
awful responsibility to God, and to society; and that the ad-
ministrators of public justice do themselves assume that re-
sponsibility if, when called on to pass judicially upon the act,
they yield to the indulgence of misapplied humanity., It is one
thing to give favourable interpretation to evidence in order to
22. Thompson 52.
23. United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (No. 15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
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mitigate an offence. It is a different thing, when we are asked,
not to extenuate, but to justify, the act.2
Judge Baldwin ventured the following general proposition at another
point in his instructions:
[S]uppose that two persons who owe no duty to one another
that is not mutual, should, by accident, not attributable to either,
be placed in a situation where both cannot survive. Neither is
bound to save the other's life by sacrificing his own, nor would
either commit a crime in saving his own life in a struggle for
the only means of safety. . . . And I again state that when
this great "law of necessity" does apply, and is not improperly
exercised, the taking of life is devested of unlawfulness."
These extended quotations starkly underscore the problem in the
courts of the right to life.26 The important factor here is that the court
did not view the functioning of the legal process as implying a moral
judgment. That is to say, while the law might, under proper circum-
stances, excuse the taking of life, it would render no moral appraisal
of the defendant's act. The law operates within the narrow confines of
legalities, and is neither concerned with nor equipped to consider the
moral overtones of the situation. Yet, pervading these words is the im-
plicit recognition that the right to life is a complex problem and the
weighing of moral considerations is important in the decisional process.
If the foregoing discussion has sufficiently demonstrated that the
right-to-life concept is not free from problems, it may be possible to de-
bate the abortion issue on a realistic and, perhaps, more humanistic
level. As has been indicated, the right-to-life concept creates a dilemma
for both the moral philosopher and the legal practitioner, for it involves
24. Id. at 366.
25. Id.
26. See also Queen v. Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). Where four
sailors were cast adrift in the open sea in a small boat, two of the sailors agreed to kill
the fourth, a youth who was weak and who, it appeared, would not survive. The youth
was killed, all three defendants fed upon his body and all three survived-as a result of
the nourishment-to tell the tale. Lord Coleridge, finding the absolute divorce of law and
morality to be a "fatal consequence," considered how to measure the comparative value
of lives. He concluded that, although the defendants' crime would not be characterized
as devilish, to excuse it would provide "a legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious
crime." Id. at 276. Lord Coleridge declined to weigh the countervailing considerations
and sentenced the defendants to death. The sentence was commutd by the Crown to six
months' imprisonment. See also E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 70 n.8 (1955) ; L. FUL-
LER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 2-27 (temp. ed. 1949) ; Fuller, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949).
1972]
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not only the problem of existence, but also the question of continued
existence.17 Professor Thompson underscores this point well:
The difficulty . . . is not peculiar to the right to life. It
reappears in connection with all the other natural rights; and it
is something which an adequate account of rights must deal
with. For present purposes it is enough just to draw attention
to it. But I would stress that I am not arguing that people do
not have a right to life-quite to the contrary, it seems to me
that the primary control we must place on the acceptability of
an account of rights is that it should turn out in that account to
be a truth that all persons have a right to life. I am arguing
only that having a right to life does not guarantee having either
a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued
use of another person's body-even if one needs it for life itself.
So the right to life will not serve the opponents of abortion in
the very simple and clear way in which they seem to have
thought it would.2"
It is interesting to note, however, that the Jewish faith takes cogni-
zance of the right-to-life problem and makes an important distinction
between fetal life, which is seen as potential life, and the mother's life,
which is seen as actual life. The hypothetical person's interest carries,
perhaps, less weight than that of the actual person. In Rabbi Feldman's
words:
"[I] f the woman were to say that she had taken thalidomide
during pregnancy (and the chances if a risk of deformity are
very great) and she wanted an abortion, because a deformed life
is not very good, the Rabbi would [say]: 'Well, you don't
27. "[W]e could not consider the implications of abortion apart from our concern
for the quality of life of the individual, the family, and society." Preface to WHo SHALL
LIvE? at vii-viii. "The effect of overpopulation on the individual human spirit may be
even more devastating than its physical results. In an impersonal, overcrowded world,
what happens to man's dignity and self-respect, to his sense of importance and ful-
fillment?" Id. at 8. The quality of life may also be tied to the literacy rate.
All of the countries that have illiteracy rates above 50 per cent have birth
rates ranging from 35 to over 50 per thousand; in most countries where illiteracy
is below 10 per cent, birth rates are under 20 per thousand. Extensive use of birth
control methods appears to come with rising aspirations, which are tied to im-
proved education and a rise in standard of living. Experience has shown that
parents limit their families for economic reasons and because they want to give
maximum opportunities to their children.
Id. at 14. See also R. HEILBRONER, Ecological Armageddon in BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND
SOCIALISM 269 (1970).
28. Thompson 56.
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know what's going to be, whether the child is going to be de-
formed and whether being deformed is worse or better than
not being born. .. .'
"But if the same woman were to phrase the question dif-
ferently and say that 'the possibility of deformity is driving me
to anguish or distraction,' then the Rabbi would say: 'Well,
now, you're talking about someone who is here and alive and.
real and all of Jewish tradition says . . . if a woman asks for
compassion in that respect, then she is entitled to it.'
"All of the burden of the law is in her favor and the
book quotes many examples in which various considerations
are weighed, one against the other. One thing emerges from the
writings of all Rabbis . . . that the welfare of the woman is
primary, and that welfare, of course, is not limited to saving
of life, but even to saving of mental health and to saving of
welfare. It might even be extended to saving her the anguish
of shame or embarrassment." 
2
It should be noted that Pope Pius XI's encyclical letter which speaks
of a duty imposed upon the woman by "nature""0 masks a concern that
transcends the temporal. The idea of original sin would seem to imply
a deeper concern than that ascribed to "nature." For example, Rabbi
Feldman says that:
". .. There is the concept of original sin which is basic to
Catholic theology and which is entirely absent from Jewish
theology.
"The Catholic idea of original sin is that Adam and Eve's
sin was a sexual one and that it was hereditary, and that every
child is born with that taint, a taint which cannot be removed
except through the waters of baptism, which symbolizes the
blood of the cross. For those who accept that Jesus died for
them, his death is the redemption for this sin and thus the
waters of baptism cleanse them of that sin. But without the act
of Baptism, the taint remains, no matter how many righteous
acts you perform, you can't remove that taint.
"The point here is that the sixth-century Saint Fulgentius,
said that that applies also to the fetus in the womb; that the
fetus in the womb is born with original sin, with the conse-
29. ABORTION RAP 108.
30. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Judaism apparently takes issue with
this characterization, at least in the case of rape. ABORTION RAP 111.
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quence, a very logical consequence, that if you have a mother
and a child locked in combat, so to speak, and it is a question
of whether this difficult pregnancy should continue, the classic
Catholic position has been to let the child be born and let the
mother die.
"That position is more logical and less cruel than it seems.
It's very consistent with this theology, because the assumption
is that the woman, twenty, twenty-five years old, was baptized
at birth and is going to heaven, whereas the fetus itself is not
baptized, will go to hell, go to eternal perdition or at least to
limbo.""1
DEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
3 2
Implicit in the foregoing analysis is the assumption that the fetus
and the mother are two persons. Under this assumption, abortion would
appear to sacrifice the right to life to which the fetus is entitled. The
arguments have partially ignored the fact that the fetus is dependent
upon the mother during most of gestation. It is perhaps on this point
that the issues revolving around the right to privacy clearly clash with
Pope Pius' encyclical. The Pope's statement indicates that the mother
has a moral duty ascribed by nature to succour the fetus at least until
it is viable, i.e., the mother bears a special responsibility for the fetus
and the fetus has rights against the mother "which are not possessed
by any independent person."38 This poses the further problem of defining
the moral and legal character of those rights.
It is perhaps this dependency factor that raises the most important
ground for attacks upon the constitutional basis of abortion statutes.
Under one view, the fetus is dependent upon the woman and there-
fore, in a sense, intrudes upon the primacy she might otherwise have
31. Id. at 109-10. Rabbi Feldman also spoke of the baptismal syringe, a device
which was developed in the eighteenth century in order to baptize a fetus still within the
mother's body in cases of possible miscarriage.
32. The fetus has heretofore been assumed to be a person. In the Hohnes case,
Circuit Justice Baldwin took judicial notice of the passengers' dependency upon the
sailors and held that "[tihe sailors and passengers, in fact, cannot be regarded as in
equal positions. The sailor . . .owes more benevolence to another than to himself. He
is bound to set a greater value on the life of others than on his own." United States v.
Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, 367 (No. 15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842). By analogy to this
dictum, the right of a fetus-as-person assumes more importance because of the depend-
ency factor. Justice Baldwin distinguished dependency situations from those involving
equality of rights, e.g., where two sailors may both lawfully struggle for possession of a
plank which would support only one of them. Id. Both situations are replete with
moral implications.
33. Thompson 58.
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over her person. Secondly, the fetus' posture of dependence is elevated by
abortion statutes to that of a right, the correlative of which is a duty
on the part of the mother not to disestablish this right of dependencel'
On the other hand, some urge that in regard to the fetus, the mother
has "the legal ability by doing certain acts to alter legal relations."'"
Therefore, the fetus-as-person would be subject to having his legal re-
lationship of dependency changed at the instance of the mother. If this
view were to be accepted, the fetus' "right" would, in the general sense,
become a mere "privilege" with no corresponding duty on the part of
the mother to endure the pregnancy. This legal power of the woman,
Chief Judge Swygert says in Doe v. Scott,"3 encompasses "constitution-
ally protected areas" that include "women's rights to life, to control
over their own bodies, and to freedom and privacy in matters relating
to sex and procreation." 8 The reasoning of the majority in Doe v.
Scott makes it clear that the basic purpose of the Illinois abortion statute
was to establish and protect what was considered to be a compelling
state interest in fetal life. The court, therefore, attempted to place the
fetal life value against the broader scheme of values that embraces our
constitutional system. It chose to characterize the issue within the
umbrella of "a fundamental, constitutionally protected right to privacy
and freedom in certain personal and intimate matters, especially those
pertaining to the home and family."" In addition, the court posed the
question whether in the event of conception a prospective mother has
a "right of choice over events which, by their character and conse-
quences, bear in a fundamental manner on the privacy of individuals."' 8
Judge Swygert then construed Griswold v. Connecticut3 and related
cases as establishing a zone of privacy around matters of "procreation
* * * marriage, the family, and sex" which protects such matters from
"unjustifiable governmental intrusion."40 The court reasoned that
within this zone of privacy, it was a woman's "fundamental interest in
choosing to terminate a pregnancy,"'" and concluded that the woman's
interest in privacy and in control over her body is "seriously interfered
with by a law which prohibits abortions .... "42 The court may have
34. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 7 (1966).
35. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. IMI. 1971).
36. Id. at 1389.
37. Id.
38. Id., quoting Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. 321 F. Supp. at 1389-90.
41. Id. at 1390.
42. Id.
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been led to this position by either of two divergent concepts. First, it
may be thought that the fetus does not acquire its status as a person until
after the first trimester following conception. Secondly, biological and
moral considerations may confer upon society an interest in the well-
being of the fetus that transcends the mother's freedom of choice or legal
power after the first trimester. The court in Doe v. Scott reasoned that
if fetal life is to be protected by social legislation, this legislation falls
within a class of laws that must be carefully examined because of the
preferred character of rights which protect actual citizens from state
interference in intimate matters. This right of choice is a vitally im-
portant right, for it attaches to the woman a right to determine under
what conditions she will bear children or allow a fetus to have an usu-
fruct over her body during the period of dependency. On this matter
Judge Swygert did not believe that "the state has a compelling interest
in preserving all fetal life which justifies the gross intrusion on a
woman's privacy which is involved in forcing her to bear an unwanted
child."43
Professor Thompson grappled with the nature of the woman's
duty vis-A-vis the dependent nature of the fetus during gestation and
concluded that, if partial moral responsibility is ascribed to the woman
for her pregnant condition, the most this line of argument can establish
is that
there are some cases in which the unborn person has a right to
the use of its mother's body, and therefore some cases in which
abortion is unjust killing. . . . [T]he argument certainly
does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing."
Judge Swygert's reasoning in Doe v. Scott" seems to imply that
it is impossible to judicially determine whether, at the instant of con-
ception, a woman "intended" to become pregant. Consequently, once
pregnancy has gone beyond the first trimester and nothing has been
done to terminate it, the fetus acquires a right to be housed in that
woman's body until it becomes viable. In effect, the relationship between
mother and fetus has accrued with the implied consent of the woman,
and she is estopped from terminating the consociation." Professor
Thompson's philosophic position seems to support the implication of
Judge Swygert's reasoning:
43. Id. at 1391.
44. Thompson 59.
45. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. IlM. 1971).
46. Thompson 65.
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If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not
obtain an abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do
not put it out for adoption, but rather take it home with them,
then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it
rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the
cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on pro-
viding for it. But if they have taken all reasonable precautions
against having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their bio-
logical relationship to the child who comes into existence have a
special responsbility for it. They may wish to assume respon-
sibility for it, or they may not wish to.- And I am suggesting
that if assuming responsibility for it would require large sacri-
fices, then they may refuse. A Good Samaritan would not re-
fuse---or anyway, a splendid Samaritan, if the sacrifices that
had to be made were enormous. 7
The majority opinion in Doe v. Scott can be described as courage-
ous because it is a brave attempt to grapple pragmatically with a seem-
ingly irreconcilable value conflict. On the one hand, it has attempted to
vindicate our veneration for the right-to-life value. On the other hand,
it has tried gallantly to be sensitive to the rights of women in their
zone of privacy. This right encompasses more than just freedom from
governmental intrusion. It affects the whole quality-of-life argument
that has been characterized as the search for human dignity for actual
human beings. To be sure, the point at which the "interest" of the fetus
becomes the business of society-after the first trimester-is an arbitrary
one. However, the line has to be drawn somewhere if society is going
to be sensitive to other competing values.
LAW, ABORTION AND COMMON MORALITY
In the preceding sections an attempt has been made to illustrate
that in the abortion context the moral, legal and social issues merge at
a level which makes it exceedingly difficult to speak of abortion laws
as being the quintessence of the "moral structure of society."" This
seems to import that society has a paramount interest in enforcing com-
pliance to patterns of behavior consistent with its notions of "public
morality" and has at its disposal to secure "appropriate" conduct the full
violence inherent in state power. One of the chief defenders of the pro-
47. Id.
48. P. DEwLiN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-11 (1965). See also Hart, Social
Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHL L. REv. 1 (1967).
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position that society should proscribe abortions through the criminal
law process is Professor Robert Byrn.49 Professor Byrn argues that if
the abortion laws are abandoned,
then the whole community value of life is in danger of breaking
down. And the next step is probably euthanasia, or the idea that
only those who contribute to society have a right to live.5"
This is merely another version of the slippery slope position. The argu-
ment holds that the criminal law may be used to preserve anything
essential to society's existence. Lord Devlin argues that because we
punish treason against the state or support the theory that "established
government is necessary for the existence of society and therefore its
safety against overthrow must be secured," we might also punish immoral
conduct because
an established morality is as necessary as good government to
the welfare of society. Societies disintegrate from within more
frequently than they are broken up by external pressures. There
is disintegration when no common morality is observed and
history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first
stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the
same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its
government and other essential institutions. The suppression
of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of sub-
versive activities .... 51
It is possible to impute this thesis to Professor Byrn inasmuch as he
feels that legalized abortions threaten the "value of life" in society, and
that ultimately society will "disintegrate" because it has denied "life"
as a standard of common morality essential for social solidarity. Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin has shown effectively that the "disintegration"
thesis often degenerates into a "conservative" thesis, i.e., that the majority
has a right to "enforce its morality by law because the majority have
the right to follow their own moral convictions that their moral en-
vironment is a thing of value to be defended from change."' 2  The
American political culture has always professed that "governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
49. See Klemesrud, For the Fetuses About to Be Aborted, He's the Legal Guardian,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1971, § C, at 48, col. 1.
50. Id.
51. P. DEVLIN, supra note 46, at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
52. Hart, supra note 48, at 2; Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Mor-
als, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
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the governed." The problem with this formulation is that it assumes
"consent," whereas practice would indicate the converse. Indeed, the
"consent of all" proposition very often dissolves into the idea of a
"sovereign majority" which is what Professor Dworkin seems to imply.
The idea of majority rule or sovereign majority sounds very democratic,
but it is fraught with complexity. This will be discussed later in the light
of at least one major political theorist.
There are a few other features of the disintegration thesis that
deserve attention. In the first instance, no historical evidence is given
to demonstrate that social disintegration occurs because of a change in
the moral posture of a society. On the other hand, Professor Hart has
attempted to demonstrate that there is, perhaps, a moral minimum for
the existence or continued existence of community life.
Hobbes and Hume have supplied us with general character-
isations of this moral minimum essential for social life: they
include rules restraining the free use of violence and minimal
forms of rules regarding honesty, promise keeping, fair dealing,
and property. 8
This moral minimum, however, is far from the proposition that
pluralistic variations in intimate sexual matters will necessarily result
in society's "disintegration" or "men drifting apart." ' The further
question is whether the abortion problem can be fairly placed within the
category of a moral pluralism in the sexual sense implied by Professor
Hart, or whether it imports considerations of a broader hue. The abor-
tion problem, it is submitted, is neither purely a matter of sexual morality
nor entirely outside the arena of societal interest relating to the right
to life, inasmuch as that value is to be weighed at a high premium in
our scale of moral values.
MORAL AND POLITICAL PLURALISM: LEGAL VALUES AND SOCIAL
PROCESS
One feature of the law-morals debate has been the very theoretical
emphasis which invokes a consideration of several general questions.
Does law enforce morality as such? If so, to what extent does law enforce
morality? If law does not enforce morality, should it be used to enforce
morality as such? How can we justify the enforcement or non-enforce-
ment of morality?5 5 The emphasis of these general propositions can be
53. Hart, 4supra note 48, at 9-10.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Professor Hart identified several questions, the answers to which might explain,
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modified if the abortion problem is considered to be a matter that can
fairly be characterized as falling within the ambit of both law and morals.
There is a point that should be clarified about the law-morals-
abortion relational compass. It has been implied by this writer that the
common morality held by a given community-or sovereign majority
within a community structure-is or can be an accepted empirical datum.
This proposition must be further examined because we are concerned
with the nature of human values. This is especially relevant to the law-
morals debate, the question reflecting the choice of values to be insti-
tutionalized or formalized and the inevitable sliding scale of pre-eminence
with which these values are realized-a question obviously related to
the situational context of events.
In terms of the nature or definition of a human value, Professor
Gerber has felicitously posed the question:
[I]s humanity determined by structure or function? By genetic
code or by social interaction? By an a priori deduction or by an
inference from social activity? . . . [I]s human value a meta-
physical conclusion of an abstract system such as natural law, or
is it attested only in the pragmatic, social interests emphasized
by sociological jurisprudence?5"
This aspect of the law-morals problem has also been identified by Pro-
fessor Morton, who argues that the crucial question concerns the "iden-
tification of values which ought to be held in a given society." This
question might be answered by reference to "religion, i.e., natural law;
secular philosophy, e.g., facist political theory or utilitarianism; .
sociological field-work; or mere idiosyncrasy" and perhaps superstitution
and anthropology like the Clapham omnibus passengers' "deep and un-
governable feelings of disgust. '5 7 It is, therefore, important to adumbrate
how values are "identified," "selected" and "applied," and what the "sub-
stance" of those values includes. The value debate must of necessity take
to some degree, the interplay between law and morality.
Has the development of the law been influenced by morals? . . . Has the de-
velopment of morality been influenced by law? . ..
. . . Must some reference to morality enter into an adequate definition
of law or legal system? . . .
• . . Is the law open to moral criticism? . . .
Is the fact that certain conduct is by common standards immoral
sufficient to justify making that conduct punishable by law?
H. HART, supra note 6, at 1-4.
56. Gerber, Abortion: Parameters for Decision, 82 ETHICS 137, 138 (1972).
57. Morton, supra note 21, at 116.
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place in what Holmes called the "market place of ideas."
It is important to note that the market place that Holmes envisioned
is a market place that occurs in the context of the social process. A
theological posture would seem to imply that values of a non-secular
character, i.e., values of metaphysical origin, are formed outside the con-
sciousness of the community and are hard to debate because such veri-
ties, as they are meant to epitomize, depend upon "faith" for their "vali-
dity." In the abortion situation, however, those wishing to make the ideas
inherent in theocratic natural law a part of the "positive" law of the state
are attempting to use the state-that ultimate repository of legitimate
violence-to support religious beliefs. But in doing this, two matters
are seemingly ignored or perhaps not fully understood. First, there seems
to be a tacit admission that strongly held beliefs within the theological
universe are too weak to prescribe patterns of religious conduct. Secondly,
there is implicit in this posture the attempt to use instruments inherent
in state power to compel "non-believers" to subscribe to the religious
norms of the church, i.e., an establishment of religion."s It is therefore
proposed that, because it is difficult to deal with the moral absolutes im-
plicit in the religious arguments about the abortion problem, and be-
cause the abortion problem is a very "social" matter, the value-forming
process will be discussed from a secular-moral viewpoint. 9 As has been
suggested, the emphasis to the values in society will take on an empirical-
secular perspective.
Social Process and Value Formation
Harold Laswell has provided a succinct outline of the social process:
"Man pursues Values through Institutions on Resources.""0 The social
58. In this context compare the following: "The law of God has taught us to be-
lieve, which laws of men cannot teach us. They can exact a different conduct from
those who fear them, but faith they cannot inspire." ST. AMBROSE, EPISTLE XXI 10
(Migne XVI 1005) quoted in A. D'ENTRtvEs, NATURAL LAW 88 (1951).
59. Gerber, supra note 56, at 138.
60. H. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 17 (Viking Compass ed. 1962) (foot-
note omitted).
Values are shaped and shared in patterns that we call institutions. The following
table gives a hint of the relation between the values . . . named and the in-
stitutions usually specialized to each in our civilization:
VALUE INSTITUTION
Power Government
Respect Social class distinctions
Affection Family, friendship, intimacy
Rectitude Church, home
Well-being Hospital, clinic
Wealth Business
Enlightenment Research, education, information
Skill Occupations
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process, therefore, provides the frame in which values might be identified.
Robert A. Dahl"' has argued that in practice the basic frame of the United
States political system has moved toward a pluralistic solution. Among
the core aspects inherent in pluralism is the practice of leaving many
policy matters of an individual and private nature beyond the legal
authority of the state, while other matters of policy are "placed in the
hands of private, semi-public, and local governmental organizations such
as churches, families, business firms, trade unions, towns, cities, pro-
vinces, and the like."62 Here there are matters that are beyond the reach
of the common moral convictions of a "sovereign" majority, thus secur-
ing for smaller groups of people and individuals a not inconsequential
degree of legal indepedence. In addition, the majority may be further
stymied by the power that non-majority groups have to obstruct, delay
or veto the policies of the majority. Dahl sums up the theory and
practice of American pluralism as follows:
Instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be
multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly
sovereign. Although the only legitimate sovereign is the people,
in the perspective of American pluralism even the people ought
never to be an absolute sovereign; consequently no part of the
people, such as a majority, ought to be absolutely sovereign. "8
It should be borne in mind that if one accepts Dahl's pluralistic
thesis, this does not mean that it is impossible for the sovereign majority
ever to eliminate the Bill of Rights as the courts have interpreted it.
Ultimately, the people can, by constitutional amendment, secure that
degree of consensus required for such action. It should also be re-
membered that the protection of minorities at the state levels of govern-
ment is notoriously deficient, "4 for few of the safeguards that obtain at
the national level of decision-making are present in state legislative pro-
cesses. Thus, the recognition of a plurality of morality will, absent a
federal question, most inevitably be at the whim of the soverign majority.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 16
n.1 (1950).
61. R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CON-
SENT 3-4 (1967).
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 24. By way of contrast, a blistering attack upon the "naturalistic" fal-
lacies allegedly inherent in political pluralism may be found in T. Lowl, THE END OF
LIBERALISM (1970).
64. This point is exemplified by various voting rights cases. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 339 (1962).
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Abortion statutes are enacted under state police power and the right to
regulate health and welfare.
What relation does the theory of American political pluralism have
to the enforcement of the abortion laws? First, this theory at least raises
the question whether the abortion problem is appropriately within the
province of matters within the reach of the sovereign majority, or perhaps
as Dworkin would have it, the "conservative" majority. Secondly, if the
abortion problem is appropriately within this sphere of socio-political
decision-making, can and should this posture give way to countervailing
values? Thirdly, is the apparatus that the majority has at its disposal
appropriate to secure the end sought?
It should be recognized that while the consent of all cannot be
obtained in a heterogeneous society, at least there can be consent about
the process. That is, while various individuals and groups which comprise
the community may differ upon substantive policies, they nevertheless
"agree" or "consent" to abide by those decisions because of the "legiti-
macy" of the decision-making process.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment. 5
It should be noted, however, that the safeguards for minorities or in-
dividuals are not so efficacious at the state level as they have proved to
be at the national level. In this regard it is not difficult to envision women
as a minority. Hence the "legitimacy" of the process at this level may
be less than compelling to many women.
Value Selection
This leads us to a second tier in the value-forming process, viz., the
question of what values are to be institutionalized-"selected" as part of
the positive law of a community. This essentially involves the choice of
values which are to be "officially adopted by the state, if necessary at
the expense of other values. The answer to this question will be political
65. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1972]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 [1972], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss3/3
306 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
and will vary according to the nature of the group holding power, i.e.,
from anarchy through paternalism to totalitarianism."6 The "process"
envisioned here relates to the machinery by which certain values are
"selected" at the expense of other values. This aspect of the social process
will indelibly reflect the intensity and manner with which certain values
are articulated, both of which are related to the distribution of power and
influence in society. The sociological aspects of this issue might be en-
compassed by asking who governs;67 and it is not without interest to
note that the interplay of power and authority is neither new nor novel in
the lawyers' universe. No less a personage than Justice Holmes saw life
as "a clash of power, and law in the main was the rationalization of the
interests of the dominant group."68
With this in mind, if one can make a distinction between "attitudes"
and "opinions," in the sense that attitudes are the predispositions that
people have and that opinions are reflective of a self-conscious position
that a person assumes, it can be seen that if self-conscious positions are
held by a large enough corpus of persons, there is an agglomeration of
"shared subjectivities" or an approximation of the ideal of "public
opinion." Opinions are formed and changed in the social context. This
means that family, school, work and community life, in addition to the
"opinion leaders" at various levels in the social structures including the
mass media, all have a profound impact upon the shaping and sharing of
dominant values in an open society at a particular time. The predominant
values may, to a large degree, depend upon the nature and distribution
of power in society. Here, elite theories 9 compete with theories of plura-
lism7" and of class rule. 1 If legislation governing most kinds of sexual
relations is deemed essential to social and legal order, or the converse,
viz., that social control over most forms of sexual behavior is a form of
repression designed to stabilize the status quo, then the relevance of these
issues seems crucial.72 Moreover, the abortion problem as it relates to
matters of sexual freedom could conceivably be seen as providing the
66. Morton, supra note 21, at 116.
67. The question is also the title of a book by Professor Dahli. R. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNs? (1961).
68. M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLmEs 44 (1943).
69. T. BorrOMORE, ELITES AND SOCIETY (1964); J. LOPREATO, VILFREDO PARETO
(1965) ; C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956); G. MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS (1939).
70. R. DAHL, supra note 67.
71. K. MARX, SELECTED WRITINGS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (T. Bot-
tomore & M. Rubel eds. 1956).
72. For a full discussion see P. ROBINSON, THE FREUDIAN LEFT (1969). A tabu-
lation of the predisposition of various societal groups toward sexual activity may be
found in Table II of the APPENDIX, infra.
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state with a powerful instrument of a repressive character with which to
reinforce social control."' That subject, however, must be left to a more
appropriate forum.
Value Application
Assuming that the process has indeed crystallized the goal to be
pursued, the question then arises how this goal is to be realized. If it is
further assumed that the goal encapsulated in legislative form is a statute
proscribing abortions, a selection of the appropriate machinery to ensure
effective compliance with the end sought must be made, thereby engender-
ing what might be characterized as the means-ends problem. It is im-
portant that the character of the particular mean be "suitable" to secure
the social efficacy of the prescription couched in legislative form. It is
almost a banal truism, as is illustrated by the experience of Prohibition,
that some means are simply inefficacious to secure patterns of social
behavior even remotely approximating conformity to the value-goal
deemed desirable.
This can be examined more closely by means of an example. Society
X has just enacted a law that prohibits the performance and procuration
of abortions except in the most extenuating circumstances. Assume that
the law is predicated upon the general community sentiment that abortion
is tantamount to murder, and that abortions have played a role in drastic-
ally reducing the population of a country which is experiencing popula-
tion depression. 4 The law is aimed at controlling the behavior of 1) preg-
nant females, 2) medical practitioners, 3) hospitals and 4) private
"agents" who might do acts which contravene the legislative intent. In
addition, assume that penal sanctions for noncompliance inhere in the
statute, and that the ordinary criminal law process is to be the chief
means of enforcement. The appropriateness of this social instrument to
realize the values the society esteems may well be questioned. How well
equipped, it may be asked, is the police force to handle this kind of
73. Interestingly, Professor Hart says that
[t]he use of legal punishment to freeze into immobility the morality dominant at
a particular time in a society's existence may possibly succeed, but even where
it does it contributes nothing to the survival of the animating spirit and formal
values of social morality and may do much harm.
H. HART, supra note 6, at 72. See also Jackson, Book Review, 82 L.Q. REv. 566 (1966).
74. It is interesting to note that when its population was being depleted because of
World War II, the government of the Soviet Union issued a decree prohibiting abortions.
This was later supplemented by another decree encouraging the raising of children and'
awarding material incentives and honorific payments. Soviet mothers apparently pro-
duced enough children, and the Praesidium issued a later decree repealing the prohibi-
tion. The principal reason given for this last decree was "to give women the possibility
of deciding by themselves the question of motherhood." G. GmsEZ, supra note 9, .at 200.
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socially "unacceptable" or "deviant" behavior? Could it not be urged
today that the police are not the ideal instruments to reinforce this kind
of moral code? Perhaps in such situations as characterize the abortion
problem, 5 where the impact upon social equilibrium is not immediate
and where the range of persons affected is not widespread, the com-
pass of functional attributes of policemen is incongenial to this type of
instrumental activity. If the goal remains constant, a certain range of
choices is open to the authoritative decision-makers. The most popular
choice seems to have been to continue ineffectually.
A second alternative is to realize that the value inherent in the goal
is simply not clear. Solutions to problems incorporating such ideas as
the right to life, the right to privacy and the right to existence are not
self-evident, and general propositions require sophisticated analysis if
they are to be useful in solving concrete problems. If this statement is
correct, it may be that the "selected" value serves the purpose of further-
ing or reinforcing what Austin called "positive morality." However, the
difficulty with this proposition is that mobilizing the criminal law to
reinforce moral standards of behavior when its role is mainly symbolic
may subvert the very essence of a moral system by atrophying those
aspects of the system which are intrinsic and peculiar to it and which
cause people to want to observe moral standards. Nevertheless, in the
abortion debate the divergence between the goals of society and actual
behavioral standards could be subject to some notion of benign neglect
or a policy of prosecuting only the most obvious and blatant violations.
This, of course, is prosecutorial discretion."
The third alternative, if we are not to be dismayed by an unfavor-
able behavioral response, is to pursue the goal by other means. What
practical means are available to a community to accomplish the desired
result? In the first instance, it may be possible to show that there is an
empirical correlation between sex education and unwanted or untimely
pregnancies. The society might increase sex education through its
schools, churches and other civic and governmental organizations. This
might increase the number of pregnancies that are planned, reduce the
incidence of those that are unplanned and also diminish the number of
possible candidates for the abortion process.
Furthermore, the society may also discover an empirical correlation
75. Lord Devlin admits that abortions fall within that class of acts "which can be
done in private and without offense to others and need not involve the corruption or
exploitation of others." P. DEvLIN, supra note 7, at 7.
76. For a discussion in the sphere of civil disobedience, see Dworkin, On Not Prose-
cuting Cihil Disobedience, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, June 6, 1968, at 14.
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between poverty, access to sex information and unplanned pregnancy,
and, therefore, make contraceptives and related medical services available
to all citizens, in particular to those most likely to impregnate or to
become pregnant. Moreover, society might broaden its concern to in-
clude a more vital interest in the children who are born by providing an
adequate level of living. Finally, many women seek abortions because of
the stigma which society attaches to both the unwed mother and her child.
The social system might encourage mothers to have their unplanned
babies if the Social Security system and the moral climate could further
the principle of human dignity instead of stigmatizing both parent and
child.
Thus far, the means-ends argument has proceeded upon the assump-
tion that the goal society has reflected in its statutes proscribing abor-
tions is a matter of "shared morality," a kind of Kantian categorical
imperative. It would be inaccurate, however, to assume that any value
judgment is accepted by all, or even a sizeable segment, of society merely
because the means is effective to secure the end result." Mere submission
in many instances, e.g., to apartheid in South Africa or segregation in
the United States, clearly cannot be construed in terms of moral cate-
gorical imperatives. It follows in regard to abortion statutes, therefore,
that to characterize the loathing of abortions as "common morality"
is to make an assumption about the value consensus. Such an attitude
assumes that most people will act in accordance with that value without
"rational debate, internal or external.""8 The issue becomes a matter of
"conscience." 78 The point perhaps comes close to the neo-Kantian idea
77. This point, of course, reinforces the pluralistic thesis.
78. Morton, supra note 21, at 116.
79. Kant, whose influence upon the analytical jurists was remarked in the
preceding lecture, began by saying that man, in endeavoring to bring his animal
self and his rational self into harmony, was presented to himself in two aspects,
an inner and an outer. Hence his acts have a twofold aspect. On the one
hand, they are external manifestations of his will. On the other hand, they are
determinations of his will by motives. On the one hand, he is in relation to
other beings like himself and to things external. On the other hand he is, as it
were, alone with himself. The law has to do with his acts in the one aspect.
Morals have to do with them in the other aspect. The problem of the law is
to keep conscious free-willing beings from interference with each other. It is
so to order them that each shall exercise his freedom in a way consistent with
the freedom of all others, since all others are to be regarded equally as ends
in themselves. But law has to do with outward acts. Hence it reaches no
further than the possibility of outward compulsion. In a legal sense there is a
right only to the extent that others may be compelled to respect it.
To quote Kant's own words: "When it is said that a creditor has the right
to exact payment from his debtor, it does not mean that he may put it to the
debtor's conscience that the latter ought to pay. It means that in such a case
19721
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 [1972], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss3/3
310 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
that the nature of law is social or objective, while morals are individual
and subjective. In short, "[m]oral experience is essentially a matter for
the individual. Legal experience is tied to the notion of a community.
8 0
The danger of excluding internal (moral) debate by the assumption of
value consensus is to elevate mere opinion to a form of absolutism distinct
from judgments formed by an internal rational debate about value choices.
The matter is thereby reduced to a matter of conscience.
CONCLUSION
In recent experience we have seen that the conscience of the man
on an airline shuttle might not react with deep and ungovernable feelings
of disgust against, for instance, Lieutenant Calley's war crimes in Viet-
nam when he, perhaps, was conditioned to believe that Calley's act was
a necessary or desirable thing, or, indeed, did not happen at all! As Pro-
fessor Morton comments: "Regrettable though it is, experience has
shown that conscience may not revolt from genocide where the subject
has been conditioned to believe that genocide is a good thing."'" On the
other hand, the assertion of a "common morality" of an impliedly sove-
reign majority, in effect, is to place the problem beyond the arena of in-
formed debate at the external level, and, thus, in a sense to foreclose
debate about those values.
On this external plane, it seems clear in the abortion context that
to talk of the abhorrence of abortions as a part of our common morality
is to attempt to exclude a rational debate about that issue and to say that
those values cannot be subject to compromise or change. It is a rigid
posture. To argue from an absolutist position about a single value in-
herent in the abortion problem to the exclusion of others seems to recite
conformity; it is a plea for the status quo.
To be sure, the considerations engendered by the abortion trauma
are serious ones. They bring up issues of a very fundamental character.
The abortion problem cannot be left entirely outside the sphere of social
payment may be compelled consistently with the freedom of everyone and hence
consistently with the debtor's own freedom, according to a universal law.
R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 97-98 (2d ed. 1926) (footnotes omitted).
80. A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 58, at 85. With this, compare the following:
The logical function of law exerts its influence where a collision between
the acts of two or more agents or an antithesis between two or more wills is
possible, and tends to promote objective ordination among them. The moral
criterion, on the other hand, supposes an antithesis between two or more pos-
sible acts of the same agents and tends to settle internal strife, that is to estab-
lish a subjective ethical order. From this come the diverse elementary charac-
teristics, which delimit the proper sphere of each.
G. DEL VECCHio, THE FORMAL BASES OF LAW 163 (1914).
81. Morton, supra note 21, at 116.
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concern; the veneration for human life simply will not allow that luxury.
No less important, however, is a concern for the quality of the human
condition-a task many eminent lawyers and social scientists conceive
as the promotion of human dignity. To see the abortion problem within
the limited compass of the right to life without conceding that this con-
ception is inextricably bound up with the ideas of existence and con-
tinued existence belittles the very humanistic values some theorists have
purported to vindicate. Moreover, the focus of so many theorists and
public policy makers in seeking to enforce abortion standards has been
almost hypnotically geared to the criminal law process to the exclusion
of other social mechanisms.
The focus upon the right to existence to the exclusion of the prob-
lems of continued existence is a common fallacy that philosophers, poets
and artists have attempted to excoriate. Indeed, the world of "being"
has no "existence" apart from the world of "becoming." These twin
aspects of reality 2 must be reconciled if the human condition is to be
explored in an informed, humanistic and scientific manner. The prob-
lem is, to be sure, very complex. It is perhaps ironic that at the poetic
level the reconciliation has been most felicitous.
Labour is blossoming or dancing where
The body is not bruised to pleasure soul,
Nor beauty born out of its own despair,
Nor blear-eyed wisdom out of midnight oil,
O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance ?s"
82. By contrast, one author indicates that space and time are characteristics of
events rather than distinct, autonomous entities. Space and time are "expressions of
certain extensional and cogredient properties of events." A. WHITEHEAD, Time, Space,
and Material: Are They, and if so in What Sense, the Ultimate Data of Science, in IN-
TERPRETATION OF SCIENCE 56, 67 (1961).
83. W. YEATS, Among School Children, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS
242, 245 (1961).
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APPENDIX
The following table indicates major provisions of recently enacted
statutes on abortion in California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Mis-
sissippi and North Carolina. The year of passage is indicated for each
statute. The statutes of Georgia and North Carolina do not distinguish
between the physical and mental health of the mother.
TABLE I
LEALPRVIIOSCAL. ICOLO. GA. IMD. IMISS.- N.. CLEGAL PROVISIONS (1967) (1967) (1968) (1968) (1966) (1967)
GROUNDS FOR ABORTION
Preserve life of mother x x x x x
Preserve physical health of mother x x x x x
Preserve mental health of mother x x x x x
Psychiatric confirmation required x
Risk of serious physical or mental
defect in child x x x x
Rape x x x x x a
Affidavit of mother required x x
Statement of district attorney or
court official required x x x x
Incest x x x
Felonious intercourse
DURATION OF PREGNANCY
Less than 16 weeks in case of rape x
Not more than 20 weeks x
Not more than 26 weeks x
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Resident of state x
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Four months except in emergency X
REQUEST OR CONSENT REQurED
Woman x x x
Woman and husband if living
together x
Parents of unmarried minor x x
Parents or guardian of incompetent x
APPROVAL OR AUTHORIZATION
Hospital review board x x x x
Certification by three doctors x x
In order to qualify for abortion under the North Carolina statute,
in the case of rape, the woman must have reported the rape within seven
days of its occurrence. Under the Maryland statute, the maximum time
within which an abortion may be performed is extended if the mother's
life is in danger or if the fetus is dead. The information in this table was
abstracted from AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, WHO SHALL
LIVE? 108-109 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
The following table indicates various doctrines regarding sexual
activity and the groups which would espouse those doctrines. The cap-
tions "left," "center" and "right" indicate only the spectrum of view-
points, not any political associations.
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TABLE II
DOCTRINE ADVOCATES
Left 1. Intercourse in all possible Believers in all possible ex-
ways is mandatory for salvation. perience.
2. Intercourse in any way is Strict antinomians.
permissible for anyone.
3. Intercourse is permissible for Dualists.
anyone as long as procreation is
avoided.
Center 4. Intercourse for women is Conventional Roman society.
decent only in marriage; inter-
course for men is permissible
with wives, concubines, prosti-
tutes.
5. Intercourse in marriage alone Much of Old Testament.
is permissible; within marriage
there are no limits or specific
purposes.
6. Intercourse in marriage alone A few Church Fathers.
is permissible provided it is not
against nature.
Right 7. Intercourse in ma r r i age Stoics.
alone is permissible and then
only for procreation.
8. Virginity is preferred, but Most Church Fathers.
intercourse in marriage, for pro-
creation only, is permissible.
9. Intercourse is never per- Strict ascetics.
missible.
J. NOONAN, CONTRACEPrION 57-58 (1966).
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